Is the human tendency toward musicality better thought of as the product of a specific, evolved instinct or an acquired skill? Developmental and evolutionary arguments are considered, along with issues of domain-specificity. The article also considers the question of why humans might be consistently and intensely drawn to music if musicality is not in fact the product of a specifically evolved instinct.
What is in a phrase?
In recent years, the phrase ''music instinct'' has become exceptionally common currency, used as the title of a television documentary (Mannes, 2009 ), a popular book on music (Ball, 2010) , and an academic journal article (Mithen, 2009) . What would it mean for human beings to possess a music instinct? And how could we tell?
There are a variety of meanings that ''music instinct'' might hold, both weak and strong. The weakest possible meaning that we might assign to the phrase music instinct would be one in which all the force is on the word instinct rather than music, in which human beings would be endowed with a general-purpose instinct that allows them to acquire culture, with music being just one among many different manifestations of acquirable culture. On the other hand, one might take the phrase music instinct in more forceful fashion, with equal weight on the words music and instinct, such that human beings were putatively endowed innately with a capacity to understand music, a desire to listen to it, and perhaps even an inborn ability to create it. On this latter view, music is not just one arbitrary instantiation of a general capacity for acquiring culture but rather a specific basket of innately wired mechanisms.
The point of this article is to evaluate the plausibility that music might be an instinct in this latter, stronger sense, and to compare that possibility with an alternative hypothesis: the notion that musicality 1 might be better understood as a product of skill learning, akin to other complex skills, such as efficiently swinging a golf club or playing chess.
What is at stake
Before considering criteria for how we might identify whether musicality is an instinct in a strong or weak sense, it is worth considering what is at stake or, more precisely, what is not at stake. It is not uncommon for lay people to see the status and prestige of music as being intimately tied to questions about music's ontogenetic and phylogenetic origins. On this view, which might be seen as an instantiation of the naturalistic fallacy (Moore, 1903) , music is perceived as valuable and worthwhile only to the extent that it is innate, inevitable, and the product of natural selection, and as less valuable to the extent that it is ''merely'' an acquired skill. Although such a coupling between music's status and its origins may seem natural, there is in fact no logical connection between the two. One can, for instance, have respect and admiration for cinematographers, even though there was no cinematography in the environment of our evolutionary adaptation. At the same time, there are many aspects of our human nature that are almost certainly grounded in our evolutionary heritage, yet hardly things to be proud of, such as our tendency toward discrimination against out-groups (Allport, 1979) .
A second preliminary that must be recognized at the outset is that evaluating the stronger sense of music as instinct really depends on two questions that are logically separable but frequently confounded: the question of whether some capacity is innate, and the question of whether the machinery underlying its operation is implemented in a fashion that is domainspecific (as opposed to deriving from mechanisms that are domain-general). Although some machinery (e.g., for acquiring language) might plausibly be both innate and domainspecific, the knowledge and machinery that allow a grandmaster to play an expert game of chess, for example, are presumably largely domain-specific, tailored specifically to chess, yet emergent only through considerable practice, and thus presumably largely learned rather than innate. To the extent that any of the particular details of music are acquired over the life span of a child, rather than literally prewired into the brain, one can ask the domain-generality question with respect to developmental mechanisms: Is the machinery that subserves musical development tailored directly to the requirements of music, or does that machinery exist in advance of an individual's experience with music and participates more broadly in a variety of domains, with music being just one among many?
Criteria for innateness
How do we know whether something is innate? The word innate itself has many meanings (Griffiths, 2002) , again varying from weak to strong. Something might be said to be innate simply if it is inevitable and universal, independently of how it is wired in the brain-in this rather weak sense, knowledge that the sun sets to the West might be ''innate,'' even if each individual learns it anew in his or her own lifetime. Or, more strongly, something might be said to be innate only if the brain was wired in advance of experience to work in some particular way. The strongest examples of innateness in this latter, stronger sense might be precocial behaviors, such as the capacity of a newborn horse to get up and walk almost immediately after birth, without requiring a great deal of trial and error (or parental instruction) to grasp the basics. Although a horse refines its gait over time (partly as a matter of developing muscle tone), the overall schema for walking seems (in horses) to derive independently of experience. In this sense, it seems perfectly reasonable to say that a horse is born with an instinct for walking. Is human musicality similarly organized prior to experience?
The looming point of comparison here (to which I will return later) is language, the domain in which arguments have perhaps most often been made for human innateness. Advocates of the innateness of human language have typically pointed to several arguments, such as the putative dissociability of language and other aspects of cognition (as in specific language impairment), the poverty of the input stimulus relative to the ultimate generative flexibility of language, the relatively young age at which languages are mastered, and the capacity of children to acquire language even in the absence of explicit negative feedback. At this juncture, one might ask both whether music would meet the same criteria, and whether those criteria are in fact adequate for establishing that language itself is innate (summarized by Pinker, 1994) . Those familiar with the child language literature will recognize that even in the domain of language a great deal of controversy lingers: scholars such as Tomasello (2008) and Goldberg (2006) continue to argue that language is a cultural acquisition rather than something that is specifically innately specified. (Goldberg, for example, writes that ''the cross-linguistic generalizations that exist are readily attributed to general cognitive, pragmatic, and processing constraints and do not require recourse to any genetic, domain-specific linguistic knowledge.'')
Here, I raise a comparable set of questions for musicality: What is the earliest evidence for musicality in children? How proficient are children at producing and comprehending music? To what extent do they rely on feedback? To what extent do they generalize beyond the input data? How resilient is the machinery for acquiring music? Is there evidence for a ''music acquisition device'' analogous to Chomsky's idea of a ''language acquisition device'' (Chomsky, 1965) , presumed to be governed by a rich universal ''grammar'' replete with specific constraints on what forms music could take in the human animal?
At the same time, one might ask, if musicality were the product of skill learning, how would we know? Perhaps the single clearest hallmark of skill acquisition might be the simple need for practice: reflexes, which virtually anyone can agree are innate, require essentially no practice; complex skills like expert-level chess playing require thousands of hours of practice (Ericsson, Prietula, & Cokely, 2007) . Where does music fall?
Of course, it must be acknowledged that musicality itself is multifaceted. Musicality clearly consists of many different components, ranging from perceptual capacities for detecting pitch and rhythm, as well as motor capacities, to emotional ⁄ theory of mind capacities for anticipating an audience's reaction. Could some of those elements be seen as inborn in domain-specific fashion, even if others are better seen as the product of a domain-general process of skill acquisition?
Evidence for the innateness of music?
Researchers studying the musical capacities of human infants have uncovered a wide range of musical capacities in infants, and even in newborns. Some of the highlights include the following:
1. Consonance and dissonance. As early as 2 months, infants prefer listening to consonance rather than dissonance (Trainor, Tsang, & Cheung, 2002) . 2. Beat induction. In a simple, regular beat, newborns can recognize the omission of a downbeat that marks the beginning of a rhythmic cycle (Winkler, Háden, Ladinig, Sziller, & Honing, 2009 ). 3. Musical intervals. Almost all Western music depends in part on the tonal relations between elements, and recent evidence suggests that even newborns are capable of detecting a seven-semitone interval (e.g., C-G) amid a series of two-semitone intervals (e.g., C-D) and vice versa (Stefanics et al., 2009 ). 4. Absolute pitch. Although there is some controversy, it may be that infants are sensitive to the absolute frequency of pitched notes in certain stimuli (Saffran & Griepentrog, 2001) . (Note, however, that infants cannot of course name individual notes, which is the heart of what would be seen as absolute pitch in adults.) 5. Memory for melody. By 8 months, infants have the capacity to encode some melodies in long-term memory (Trainor & Trehub, 1992) . 6. Coordination between motion and rhythm. By 7 months, infants prefer listening to a rhythmic pattern that is in time with a pattern of induced (bouncing) motion to a rhythmic pattern that is out of synchrony with that induced motion (Phillips-Silver & Trainor, 2005) . 7. Neural specialization. A recent fMRI study suggests that in newborns' brains, music preferentially evokes the right hemisphere (Perani et al., 2010) . More broadly speaking, there is ample evidence that music has strong biological underpinnings (e.g., Koelsch & Siebel, 2005; Peretz, 2006; Schlaug et al., 2009 ).
In addition, there is strong evidence that in most if not all cultures, mothers sing to infants and even ordinary adults can identify which of a pair of non-Western songs is directed at infants at an above chance (63%) rate (Trehub, Unyk, & Trainor, 1993) . Does all this evidence merit the conclusion that musicality is in fact innate? The mere fact that music is biologically instantiated tells us little about innateness, since even culturally specific skills like golf-playing (Jäncke, Koeneke, Hoppe, Rominger, & Hänggi, 2009) appear to induce biological change but presumably are neither innate nor the product of specific adaptation. Ultimately, the answer to questions about the developmental and evolutionary origins of music depends in part on what is meant by musicality. Pitch and rhythm are clearly components in most (although not all 2 ) adult forms of music, and the connection between music and the desire to move is near-universal.
3 But if music were a genuine instinct, one might expect a rich literature on musical universals; instead, recent reviews indicate that cross-cultural universals in music are few in number, relatively weak, and difficult to specify (Nettl, 2000) . Stevens (2012), for example, notes that even the foundational presumption that note frequencies are related to one another logarithmically (as they are in Western scales), rather than linearly, has recently been challenged (by studies of Australian Aboriginal music); Cross (2012) argues music itself can only be interpreted in terms of context, culture, and history. To the extent that there are relatively few firm universals, one has further reason to view music as cultural invention, rather than a directly prewired instinct.
Indeed, many of the things that adults take for granted about music seem to be acquired developmentally, and presumably they are acquired in early childhood, rather than present at birth; many also appear to be culturally dependent. Consider the following.
1. Discrete notes. Most toddlers do not grasp the convention, near-universal in the West, of singing discrete notes within a musical scale (such as the set of 12 chromatic notes, C, C#, D, D#, etc.). Western children (the children whose musical development has been most thoroughly documented) tend early in development to sing in a fashion that is imprecise and inaccurate, with a great deal of gliding between notes (Davidson, McKernon, & Gardner, 1981; Dowling, 1982) . 2. Melodic contour. Children's earliest efforts at singing-the productive component of music that a priori could be most plausibly seen as an inborn product of evolution 4 -are focused largely around lyrical content rather than melodic contour (Davidson et al., 1981) ; it takes until the age of 4 or 5 before the typical child's song is recognizable by both melody as well as tune (Mckernon, 1979) , and young children's memories for song seem to similarly be organized more around lyrics than contour (Morrongiello & Roes, 1990) .
2 Some forms of music have only rhythm without variation in pitch (e.g., some forms of pure percussion), and other forms of music (e.g., recitative) have variation in pitch without any regular temporal periodicity. For further discussion of musical universals and cross-cultural differences, see articles in this issue by Cross (2012) and Stevens (2012) . For an ethnomusicologist's review of what might or might not be universal about music see Nettl (2005) . Some individuals are tone-deaf, and some are largely indifferent to music, hence presumably not moved to dance.
3. Harmony and accompaniment. Although young children seem to be able to distinguish dissonant chords from consonant chords, their overall understanding of harmony is limited. There is some evidence that children under the age of 5 can detect harmonic violations in familiar songs (Corrigall & Trainor, 2009 ) but less evidence that they can do the same for unfamiliar songs, suggesting a lack of generalizable knowledge. Along the same lines, many young children are largely unaware of whether the harmonic backing accompaniment of a song is or is not consonant with the melody (CostaGiomi, 2003). 4. Practice. Musical ability is significantly correlated with amount of practice, even after several years of significant investment (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993; Sloboda, Davidson, Howe, & Moore, 1996) , consistent with a view of music as an acquired skill; the brain appears to follow suit with practice apparently eliciting neural changes, even under controlled experimental conditions (Schlaug et al., 2009 ). This is not only most obviously evident in musical performance but also in perceptual capacities such as the ability to perceive individual notes within a chord (Marco, McLachlan, & Wilson, 2010) . Furthermore, absent specific tuition, a sizable proportion of the population (perhaps 15%) never learns to carry a tune (Dalla Bella, Giguère, & Peretz, 2007; Pfordresher & Brown, 2007) . Other putatively innate skills such as walking and talking are far more uniformly acquired throughout the population. 5. Rhythmic independence. In production, all but the simplest rhythms require extensive practice. Independence between limbs takes considerable effort to develop, and it may never be fully achieved (Summers, 2002) . Relative to machines that can create arbitrary polyrhythms with a high degree of precision, humans struggle even with relatively simple polyrhythms, unless steeped extensively in them (e.g., as in some African cultures). 6. Perfect pitch. Whether or not there is an innate contribution, the ability to identify an individual note by name in the absence of a reference point requires practice (Deutsch, Henthorn, Marvin, & Xu, 2006) . 7. Musical contour. Even relative pitch requires practice. Naive listeners are easily misled by transpositions, suggesting a coarse representation of music (at least in memory). Although the ability to recognize an isolated tone as the same or different is quite precise, untrained listeners are often barely above chance in recognizing in-key alterations in transpositions of even relatively short melodies (Cuddy & Cohen, 1976; Dowling, 1978) .
More broadly speaking, although there is a strong case to be made that some of the rudiments of music are inborn, there is also good reason to think that a significant part of musical attainment, both in production and comprehension, depends on practice, and likely on culture, often taking years to develop. It is not just that, as the cliché goes, practice makes perfect, or that high-level expertise takes years of practice (as amply documented by scholars such as Ericsson and Sloboda, cited above), but that even ordinary garden-variety skills that many adults take for granted, such as singing in key or representing a song in terms of collections of discrete notes, appear to be learned achievements rather than automatic elements of the human mind.
Evidence for the domain-specificity of music
To the extent that a reasonable case could be made for the proposition that at least some of the rudiments of music are nonetheless in place in infancy without the need for significant skill learning, one could ask whether those rudiments are specific to music. Remarkably little is known about the extent to which early signs of musicality are reflections of domainspecific or domain-general machinery. For example, although there is good evidence that 7-month-olds can recognize the synchrony (or lack of synchrony) between an audition and motion (Phillips-Silver & Trainor, 2005) , that synchrony might conceivably be just one instantiation among many of a larger preference for cross-modal synchrony in infancy (Lewkowicz, 2002) and across species (Stein & Stanford, 2008) . Likewise Winkler et al.'s (2009) recent work showing that infants recognize aberrant musical beats could represent a particular predisposition to music but also simply be a particular instantiation of a general tendency of the brain to recognize mismatches (Näätänen, Tervaniemi, Sussman, Paavilainen, & Winkler, 2001 ). To the extent that non-vocal music has been directly compared with speech, infants prefer speech (Standley & Madsen, 1990 ) and appear to be better at analyzing it in an abstract way (Gervain, Berent, & Werker, 2009; Marcus, Fernandes, & Johnson, 2007) .
Neurophysiologically, there is no clear ''music center''; rather brain substrates of music largely consist of regions such as Broca's area (Fadiga, Craighero, & D'Ausilio, 2009 ), prefrontal cortex (Bengtsson, Csíkszentmihályi, & Ullén, 2007) , and amygdala (Limb, 2006) that play significant roles in non-musical activities, even in species that are not musical. In particular, many studies have shown that there is overlap between the regions of the brain that process speech and those that process music (e.g., Koelsch et al., 2004; Peretz & Zatorre, 2005; Zatorre & Gandour, 2008) . Music may rely on a unique configuration of brain areas, but most if not all of those areas serve other purposes as well.
Ultimately, I concur with Trehub and Hannon (2006) , who write that ''the most parsimonious interpretation of the available evidence is that infant skills are a product of general perceptual mechanisms that are neither music-nor species-specific.''
Natural selection?
Were ''musical notes and rhythm … first acquired ... for the sake of charming the opposite sex?'' as Darwin wrote? Although it is commonly assumed that music is the product of either natural or sexual selection (Darwin, 1874; Levitin, 2006; Miller, 2000) , Pinker (1997) and Patel (2010) have both argued that music may be a by-product of selection rather than a direct product of selection.
In my judgment, the evidence that music is a product of natural selection is relatively weak. A variety of adaptive pressures have been proposed, for example, for social cohesion, communication, or conflict reduction (for reviews, see, e.g., Huron, 2001; Wallin, Merker, & Brown, 2001; Fitch, 2006 ; and articles in the September 2009 issue of Musica Scientiae), but aside from items such as a bone flute dated to approximately 35,000 years ago (Conard et al., 2009; d'Errico et al., 2003) , little direct evidence for music exists, archaeological or otherwise, until sometime after most scholars believe language evolved (e.g., 50,000 years ago, according to Klein & Edgar, 2002;  or several hundred thousand according to Bickerton, 2009) , and although music is ubiquitous across cultures, many individuals prosper without being able to carry a tune; language impairments, by contrast, are far rarer. Perhaps the most vigorous argument for sexual selection comes from Miller (2000) , who argues that music is a biological propensity that was shaped by sexual selection. Men play music because women like music; Miller's flagship case is Jimi Hendrix who ''had sexual liaisons with hundreds of groupies, maintained parallel long-term relationships with at least two women, and fathered at least three children in the United States, Germany, and Sweden. Under ancestral conditions before birth control, he would have fathered many more.' ' Miller also reports that in a sample of 6,000 recent jazz, rock, and classical albums, 90% were produced by men. Although Miller's proposal is frequently cited, and was endorsed by Levitin (2006) , there are several reasons to be skeptical (some noted before, e.g., by Huron, 2001 and by Fitch, 2006) .
First, in most aspects of physiology that are shaped by sexual selection, we generally see a significant dimorphism between men and women. Peacocks have plumage, their female counterparts do not; male songbirds sing, females generally do not. Although human data might initially seemed to have suggested a dimorphism in the human species, as Miller's data on music recordings suggest, that apparent dimorphism instead likely reflects a historical ⁄ sociological artifact rather than a necessary fact about human biology. For example, prior to the advent of blind auditions (in which aspiring musicians play behind a screen), men drastically outnumbered women in most orchestras; now most symphonies are near parity.
Second, the sexual selection theory conflates the powerful image of a few exceptionally talented guitarists (such as Hendrix) with the realities of most musicians. Some musicians probably do indeed have a large number of mates, but sexual selection can serve as a plausible explanation for the origin of music only if there is a net positive effect across all musicians, and I am aware of no data to suggest that. (Indeed, to the extent that mating success is correlated with income there is some reason to be skeptical. Only about half of collegedegreed musicians, for instance, are even able to make a living in a musical career; Bennett, 2007.) Moreover, although Hendrix lived in a time in which it was possible for musicians to make millions of dollars and become internationally famous, whatever genes contributed to music evolved long before there were radio stations or record deals. Court jesters made music, too, but their status was hardly that of contemporary rock stars. Any serious theory of musical evolution must reckon with the fact that the life of a musician was not always as potentially prestigious as it is now.
Third, theories in which music is seen as a specific target of natural or sexual selection might sometimes seem to imply the existence of specific music module in the brain that was somehow targeted by evolution, but as we saw earlier, there is no clear evidence of a distinct ''music center'' in the brain, but rather a coalition of neural tissue virtually none of which appears to be specialized for music. This in turn suggests that music might either be a byproduct of heterogeneous evolution (Brattico & Jacobsen, 2009 ) or a simply a culturally acquired technology that draws on a diverse basis of (perhaps domain-general) components, rather than a specific target of selection. The available genetic evidence points in a similar direction: no specific targeting of music during selection. Although musical aptitude seems heritable (Drayna, Manichaikul, de Lange, Snieder, & Spector, 2001; Vinkhuyzen, van der Sluis, Posthuma, & Boomsma, 2009) , no gene has yet been specifically and uniquely tied to music. More typical may be genes like AVPR1A (Ukkola, Onkamo, Raijas, Karma, & Järvelä, 2009) , which seems correlated with musical skill, but in a domain-general way that is tied with social behavior more broadly construed (Ebstein et al., 2009) . (Language, too, may turn out to draw heavily on domain-general components, if recent neuroscience is a guide; for a review of the genetic evidence, see Fisher & Marcus, 2006.) Fourth, many theories of music evolution seem musically naïve inasmuch as they treat all music equally, leaving little room for the aesthetics of individual compositions, as if, for example, any chord progression was as effective as any other, and as if all genres were equally liked by all listeners. The reality is that some arrangements of notes move us; others do not, both as a function of the composition of a given piece (a topic which few adaptationist theories address) and as a function of broader personality variables (Rentfrow & Gosling, 2007) , and group identification (Lonsdale & North, 2009) . To the extent that adaptationist theories ignore these differences, no one genre pleases everybody, and no one song pleases everybody. A fully adequate theory would need to address both listener-wise differences and the sort of common properties that music theory tries to characterize; one that treats every melody equally should perhaps be viewed skeptically.
Another common claim is that music evolved because it leads to social bonding (Cross & Morley, 2009) . Although the data of Lonsdale and North (2009) confirm the widespread intuition that music can indeed induce bonding, the mere coincidence between the two is not enough to establish a causal evolutionary arrow. Theories that tie music to its bonding capability typically do not engage with why particular patterns of sound organized over time should play any special role in bonding. Furthermore, they miss the fact that many other things that manifestly were not part of our adaptive heritage-like the cultural invention of drinking beer (perhaps 12,000 years ago, hence after most of human evolution already occurred; Hayden, Canuel, & Shanse, 2012) -also induce social cohesion. Likewise, although singing may soothe infants or facilitate mother-child bonding (Trehub & Trainor, 1998) , such functions may be side consequences of language, rather than a direct adaptation (Fitch, 2006) .
Music as cultural invention
My own view, then, consistent with Pinker (1997) and Patel (2010) , is that musicality should be seen not as a direct target of selection, but rather as something that the human mind can-and often does, across a broad range of cultures-naturally acquire, given a range of other mechanisms that were more directly selected for.
In keeping with this interpretation of the literature, it is worth reflecting briefly on the history of music in our own culture, and the fact that many of the most salient aspects of modern music, such as keyboards, harmony, and the now ubiquitous 12 Bar Blues form, have only a relatively brief history (Grout, Burkholder, & Palisca, 2006) . With overdubs, Autotune, harmony, drum machines, and so forth, contemporary music differs sharply from much of the music that preceded it historically; new instruments and techniques often appear and rapidly spread throughout the musical world in a way that is reminiscent of natural selection. Although it would be folly to conclude that music has improved in an artistic sense over historical time, it seems clear that the range of available tools and techniques has broadened considerably. Just as auto manufacturers have improved their craft through a mixture of new tools (like robots and power tools) and techniques (e.g., assembly lines), musicians draw on an ever-expanding toolkit for entertaining human minds. Music may be as captivating as it is partly because so many skilled practitioners have so actively developed the craft for so long.
If music is not innate, why do we love it so?
If music is not in fact an instinct in the strong sense, as I have tentatively argued, a new question immediately arises: Why do we like music so much, if it is neither hard-wired nor a specifically selected product of evolution?
The first thing to note, of course, is that across time and culture, different people have liked different sorts of music. Synthesizers might well sound weird or even intolerable to many of our prehistoric predecessors, and for some listeners the sounds of a sitar or gamelan ensemble is at best an acquired taste. When it comes to the prevalence of musicality, above and beyond variation in individual taste, I would suggest that there is not a single answer but many, and that music is as compelling as it is precisely because it draws so heavily on such a broad range of cognitive underpinnings. Consistent to some extent with Pinker (1997) and with Huron's (2005) suggestion that music yields ''plural pleasures,'' here is a partial list of domain-general mechanisms that might collectively undergird music's powerful hold on the human imagination, even if music were not per se either innate or a direct product of natural selection:
1. A domain-general preference for clearly parsable auditory stimuli, comparable to the preference for hypernormal stimuli (e.g., Tinbergen, 1953) which makes us enjoy (other things being equal) sharp, high-definition pictures more than pictures that are low-resolution or out of focus. Instruments (especially traditional physical instruments) have been selected to produce clear signals that are not muddied. Our preference for consonance over dissonance (McDermott, Lehr, & Oxenham, 2010) could be seen the same way: as domain-general reflexes of an internal aesthetic that strives to avoid sensory degradation (Huron, 2005) . 2. Liking for familiarity. Young children seem to have less clearly defined between-genre preferences than adults (Hargreaves & North, 1999) , and in any domain, music included (North & Bargreaves, 1995; Schellenberg, Peretz, & Vieillard, 2008; Szpunar, Schellenberg, & Pliner, 2004) , people have a tendency to come to like that which is familiar (Bornstein, 1989; Zajonc, 1968) . At least in music, those preferences seem to be shaped most strongly in adolescence, perhaps because that is when most people spend the most time listening to music (North & Hargreaves, 1995) . 3. Similarity to the human voice. From birth, the human voice is one of the most attractive stimuli to human beings (Vouloumanos & Werker, 2004 , and early in life it is preferred to purely instrumental music (Standley & Madsen, 1990) . It is a common observation that many instrumentalists try to achieve an effect that is reminiscent of the human voice (some would speculate that the violin achieves some of its potency because of its capacity to do so), and there is good evidence that some of the emotional mediators of instrumental music closely parallel modulators of emotion in speech (Juslin & Laukka, 2003) . Music that is most preferred often shares many characteristics with speech, including prosody and phrasing. One study suggests that the properties of melodies by English and French composers echo differences in the stress patterns of their languages (Patel, 2003) , with the songs presumably having developed more recently than the language's respective stress patterns. A recent study of a large sample of computer-generated fractal (1 ⁄ f ß ) melodies suggests that the most preferred melodies are those that most resemble speech in their spectral and temporal characteristics (Beauvois, 2007) . 4. A domain-general aesthetic preference, possibly derived from reward systems that predate aesthetic pleasure altogether, for forms of input that yield reward both for novelty Guitart-Masip, Bunzeck, Stephan, Dolan, & Düzel, 2010) and for correct predictions (Pessiglione, Seymour, Flandin, Dolan, & Frith, 2006) . Musicians can draw on a vast array of techniques such as repeating a familiar melody with different lyrics, or a new melody set against a familiar rhythm, or with new instrumentation, to simultaneously deliver novelty and familiarity in a single everchanging package. 5. Music may benefit, to some extent, relative to some other arts because of its intrinsically temporal nature (Kivy, 1993) , which allows for extended bouts of the pleasure that derives from the confluence of novelty and prediction. 6. Like all other arts, music may capitalize on its domain-general potential to serve as a focal point for affiliation. People tend to like other people that share their preferences, and because the possibilities of music are so diverse (especially in contemporary life, when there are many specialized genres), there is great potential for differential affiliation based on differential preference. One line of recent studies suggests that musical preferences serve as potent and veridical group identifiers (Rentfrow & Gosling, 2006 ; another suggests that in-group favoritism is indeed mediated to some degree by shared musical preference (Lonsdale & North, 2009; Selfhout, Branje, ter Bogt, & Meeus, 2009 ).
In short, even if music is an instinct only in a weaker, more domain-general sense that depends on extensive skill learning to fully develop, it lives in the company of a great many of the mechanisms that bring us pleasure, and it should be no surprise that we enjoy it so very much.
